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"Unless export controls are more narrowly defined and carefully targeted,
they will increasingly do more harm than good
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the United States Congress tied the hands of the domestic commer-
cial communications satellite industry by shifting all commercial satellites
from the business-friendlier export controls of the Department of Commerce to
the Department of State's more stringent control? To an extent, Congress knew
that the decision could have a large impact on the industry.'
t J.D. Candidate and Comparative and International Law Institute Candidate, May 2011,
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
I Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Losing Controls: How U.S. Export Restrictions Jeopardize
National Security and Harm Competitiveness, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2009 at 11, 18.
2 "Commercial" here includes both purely commercial and "dual use" communications
satellites. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (2009); 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009); see also Ryan Zelnio, A
Short History of Export Control Policy, THE SPACE REv., Jan. 9, 2006,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/528/1. Generally, dual use hardware and technical
data have both a civilian and military application. See infra Part II(C)(2). The State Depart-
ment already controlled communications satellites with strictly military purposes. See 22
C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009).
3 Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-261, 112 Stat. 1920, 2173-74 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C § 2778). This move was
mandated because Congress believed that it was in the "national security interests of the
United States that United States satellites and related items be subject to the same export
controls that apply under United States law and practices to munitions." Pub. L. No. 105-
261, 112 Stat. 1920, 2173. See Jeff Foust, One Nation, Over Regulated: Is ITAR Stalling the
New Space Race?, AD AsTRA, Fall 2005, available at
http://www.nss.org/adastra/volumel7/itar.html (comparing the "permissive" regulations of
the Commerce Department to the more stringent State Department controls regarding satel-
lite technologies).
4 See Transfer of Satellite Technology to China: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
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Since Congress' decision, a wave of increased defense spending has over-
burdened the Department of State's already scarce resources to approve satel-
lite hardware and technology exports.' During the same period, increased pri-
vatization and globalization trends have created intense competition in the
global communications satellite market.6 The more heavy-handed regulations
administered by the Department of State ("DOS" or "State Department") have
put great strains on the American communications satellite industry's progress
in research, development, sales, and international collaboration.7 As the United
States loses ground as the world's primary economic superpower, other coun-
tries and foreign companies are able to avoid the U.S. regulations by simply
excluding American satellite companies This effect ultimately harms both
American commercial interests and national security.9
Prior to Congress shifting control to the State Department, the president,
under authority granted by Congress, decided which agency was responsible
for controlling the exports of a particular piece of hardware or technical data.'"
Under this authority, in 1996, President William J. Clinton designated the De-
partment of Commerce ("DOC" or "Commerce Department") to regulate non-
military satellites."
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 105th Cong. 22 (1998) (statement of William A.
Reinsch, Under Secretary for Export Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
' See Debra Werner, NRC Report Says U.S. Export Control System Is "Broken ", SPACE
NEWS, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.spacenews.com/archive/archive09/itar 011 9.html (sum-
marizing a report by the National Research Council and noting weaknesses in the Depart-
ment of State regulations); Mark Thompson, In Lean Times, Military Spending Still Gets a
Pass, TIME, Feb. 24, 2010, available at
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1967353,00.html.
6 See TERRENCE R. GUAY, STRATEGIC STUDIES INST., GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 21-46 (Feb. 2007), available at
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB756.pdf (explaining the effects of glob-
alization on defense programs around the world).
7 DEPT. OF DEF., DEF. INDUS. BASE ASSESSMENT: U.S. SPACE INDUS. FINAL REP. x-xi
(2007), available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/defmarketresearchrpts/exportc
ontrolfinalreportO8-31-07master._ 3---bis-net-link-version--- 101 707-receipt-from-afrl.pdf
[hereinafter DEF. INDUS. BASE ASSESSMENT].
8 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, China Launches New Communications Satellite,
SPACE.COM, July 6, 2007,
http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/070706_chinasat6blnch.html.
9 Wallerstein, supra note 1, at 13-14.
10 Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006) ("AECA"). Decisions
were made under the president's delegated authority under the AECA, and this authority
was then delegated to the Secretary of State. Exec. Order No. 11,958, 3 C.F.R. 79 (1977).
See 22 C.F.R. § 120.6 (2009) (defining defense article); 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (defining tech-
nical data); 22 C.F.R. § 120.9 (defining defense service).
1 Removal of Commercial Communications Satellites and Hot Section Technology
From State's USML for Transfer to Commerce's CCL, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,894-56,896 (Nov. 5,
1996) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121.1); see also Jeff Gerth, U.S. Business Role in Policy on
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However, in 1998 Congress launched an investigation into two United
States based satellite companies' transfer of sensitive data to China.'2 The
committee investigating the transfer of sensitive data blamed the incident on
the inadequacies of the DOC export controls. 3 Yet, the data transfer would
have been illegal under Department of State regulations as well. 14 Critics of the
Clinton administration also used the incident to highlight what was perceived
as the president's favoritism for the satellite industry's commercial interests. 5
With concern mounting over how China's military capabilities could be en-
hanced from this data transfer, 6 Congress quickly passed legislation removing
the president's authority to decide which system of export controls were the
best fit for all satellites. 7 While the jurisdictional decision for all other items
remained under the executive branch, satellites became the exception. 8
Congress should return to the president the power to determine which agen-
cy should control export of commercial communications satellites. Congress
has entrusted the president with deciding the proper controls for all other ex-
ports including those of nuclear weapons, missiles, and warships. 9 Failed at-
tempts to revise the Arms Export Controls Act in past years2" have also shown
that Congress cannot react quickly enough to this problem even when the
American communications satellite industry is unnecessarily losing global
market share that will not be easily recovered.2' There is a strong case for the
Department of Commerce to regain control, and it is in both the commercial
and national security interests of the United States to allow the president to
China is Under Question, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1998, at Al.
12 See Gerth, supra note 11.
13 See SHIRLEY A. KAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA: POSSIBLE MISSILE TECHNOL-
OGY TRANSFERS UNDER U.S. SATELLITE EXPORT POLICY - ACTIONS AND CHRONOLOGY 25-
26 (Oct. 6, 2003), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47794.pdf.
14 See infra Part II.C and accompanying notes 48-86 (discussing how export controls
are put in place).
15 See Transfer of Satellite Technology to China: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science and, Transportation, 105th Cong. 2-4 (1998) (statement of Sen. John
McCain) [hereinafter China Satellite Technology Hearing].
16 See Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Commercial Space Cooperation Should Not Harm Na-
tional Security, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.), June 26, 1998, at 1, 4, 5,
7, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/23722_1.pdf
(discussing various forms of technology that China was believed to have obtained or could
obtain in the future from the data transfer).
17 Pub. L. No. 105-261, § 1513, 112 Stat. 1920, 2174 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C §
2778).
18 Id.
19 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (allowing the president to control items on the United States Muni-
tions List); 22 C.F.R. § 121.1.
20 See, e.g., Defense Trade Controls Performance Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 4246,
110th Cong. (2007); Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008,
H.R. 5916, 110th Cong. (2008).




Part II of this Comment provides a background on communications satel-
lites, export controls, and their interrelation throughout modem history. Part III
presents the reasons why Congress' decision to move commercial communica-
tions satellites under State Department control has proven to be a mistake, as
the trends of globalization and privatization have increased competition in the
international market. Part IV analyzes why Congress originally made the deci-
sion to transfer control to the Department of State and remove presidential au-
thority over the export designation of satellite communications, and argues that
Congress seized the opportunity to remove power from the executive branch.
Part V argues that on this particular issue, the president is best suited to decide
which agency should control satellite exports, and that the Department of
Commerce should be that agency. Part VI concludes that Congress should
make this change immediately.
II. COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES AND EXPORT CONTROLS
Since its inception, the American communications satellite industry has
made significant technological advancements with considerable competition
from around the world.2 At the same time, U.S. export controls have evolved
along two separate paths: one strictly involving military equipment and tech-
nologies and the other for items that have both military and civilian applica-
tions. 3 As an increasing number of communications satellites have been used
for commercial purposes, the federal government has struggled to conclude
which set of export controls best protects both national security and business
interests. 4
A. Introduction to Communications Satellites
In 1957, the U.S.S.R. launched Sputnik I, "the world's first artificial satel-
lite."25 As the Cold War continued, the Sputnik I launch initiated a period of
fierce competition between the Soviets and Americans called the "Space
Race," leading to rapid advances in space technologies. 6 However, some
22 See NASA, Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/
(last visited March 10, 2010) [hereinafter Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age] (outlin-
ing the competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union to be the first country to reach
space).
23 See infra discussion accompanying notes 51-86 (describing at length the export con-
trols of the State Department and the Commerce Department).
24 See infra discussion accompanying notes 87-92.
25 Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, supra note 22.
26 See id.; MARTIN WALKER, THE COLD WAR: A HISTORY 1-2 (1994).
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Americans feared that the Soviet Union had developed the capability to launch
nuclear missiles from Europe at the United States, and the U.S. Department of
Defense quickly provided additional funding for projects to expedite Amer-
ica's entry into space. 7 In 1958, Congress passed the National Aeronautics and
Space Act, which provided funding for U.S. space development and created
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA")."
In January 1958, the United States launched its first satellite, Explorer L29
The Department of Defense launched America's first communications satellite,
SCORE, in December 1958.30 In 1960, AT&T shocked the U.S. government by
seeking permission from the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to
launch its own experimental communications satellite." Congress responded
by passing the Communications Satellite Act of 196232 to address the commer-
cialization of communications satellites and created the Communications Sat-
ellite Corporation ("COMSAT") to facilitate industry cooperation." In 1965,
COMSAT launched its first satellite, beginning the era of truly global commu-
nications satellites.
Today, more than fifty years after Sputnik I's launch, there are hundreds of
satellites in space." Of the orbiting satellites still in working operation, ap-
proximately two-thirds are used for communications. 3 6 Modem society has
become dependent upon the capabilities provided by communications satel-
lites:
Communications satellites serve as relay stations, receiving radio signals from one lo-
cation and transmitting them to another. A communications satellite can relay several
television programs or many thousands of telephone calls at once .... Countries and
commercial organizations, such as television broadcasters and telephone companies,
27 Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, supra note 42.
28 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2472 (2006)).
29 NASA, The First United States Satellite and Space Launch Vehicle,
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/expinfo.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
30 Donald H. Martin, A History of US. Military Satellite Communications Systems,
CROSSLINK, http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2002/01.html (last visited
March 22, 2010). After NASA launched Sputnik I, NASA experimented with "passive"
communications satellites, while the DOD continued working with "repeater" communica-
tions satellites which had the potential to provide much higher quality communications.
David J. Whalen, Communications Satellites: Making the Global Village Possible, NASA
HISTORY DIVISION, http://history.nasa.gov/satcomhistory.html (last visited March 10, 2010).
31 Whalen, supra note 30.
32 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
33 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 423.
34 Whalen, supra note 30.
35 What's in Space?, ENSURING SPACE SEC. (Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge,





use these satellites continuously. 3
Satellite communications also facilitate communications in developed na-
tions in the event of a natural disaster or terrorist attack.38 These satellites fa-
cilitate communications involving sensitive matters of national defense and
security.39 For example, communications satellites allow soldiers to know
where their allies are and even where their enemies are hiding. 40 Although the
space industry's initial rapid growth was fueled by national security concerns
and Department of Defense funding, "[s]atellite communications is . . . the
only truly commercial space technology ....
B. Communications Satellite Industry
The space industry consists of manufacturers and service providers of
spacecraft, propulsion systems, ground systems, and specialty materials, 42 and
the industry includes companies with varying degrees of concentration on mili-
tary items.43 "Industry," as used in this Comment, is the commercial communi-
cations satellite industry that includes manufacturing, launching, and other ser-
vices relating to communications spacecraft such as antenna, microwave, and
digital technology; switching equipment, transponders, laser technology, and
software involved with communications spacecraft. There are four major U.S.
manufacturers-Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Orbital, and Space Systems/Loral. 4
The analysis below will focus on the commercial portion of the industry, con-
ceding for these purposes that the best place for military communications satel-
lites is under military type controls.
The space industry is a significant sector of the U.S. economy, and spends
an average of $2.2 billion annually on research and development. 5 The satellite
industry directly employs approximately 250,000 people in the United States,
37 John E. Oberright, NASA Artificial Satellites,
http://www.nasa.gov/worldbook/artificialsatellitesworldbook.html (last visited March 22,
2010).
38 SATELLITE INDUST. Assoc., FIRST RESPONDER'S GUIDE TO SATELLITE COMMUNICA-
TIONS 4-6 (2006), available at http://www.sia.org/guide.pdf.
39 See Donald H. Martin, A History of U.S. Military Satellite Communications Systems,
CROSSLINK, http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2002/01.html (last visited
March 22, 2010).
40 Id.
41 See Whalen, supra note 30.
42 Cf DEF. INDUS. BASE ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at Appendix 10-13.
43 Cf id.
44 Export Controls on Satellite Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terror-
ism, Nonproliferation and Trade, 11 th Cong. 43 (2009) [hereinafter Export Controls Hear-
ing] (statement of Patricia Cooper, President, Satellite Indust. Assoc.).
45 DEF. INDUS. BASE ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 27.
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including a large number of highly-skilled and highly-trained workers.46 Al-
though only a part of the global space industry, the number of commercial
communications satellites launched "represent[s] a key measure of competi-
tiveness and an indicator for future manufacturing capabilities."47
C. Introduction to Export Controls
In general, U.S. export controls function by designating certain types of
hardware and technical data as warranting special procedures to leave the
country.4" Transfers of the designated items require prior authorization in the
form of a license or other approval. 9 The Department of State and the Depart-
ment of Commerce have historically controlled the exports of commercial
communications satellites."
1. Department of State
The Department of State controls the transfers of hardware and defense ser-
vices with a predominant military application." The State Department's au-
thority comes from the Arms Export Control Act ("AECA"), which was en-
acted during the Cold War in 1976.52 The AECA placed stringent requirements
on the president to administer an export control regime in order to protect U.S.
defense technologies53 and retain a competitive advantage. 4 Under AECA au-
thority, the State Department regulates arms exports and temporary imports
through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR").55
Within the ITAR is the United States Munitions List, which contains twen-
ty-one categories designating the hardware and technical data requiring the
46 Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 38 (statement of Patricia Cooper, Presi-
dent, Satellite Indust. Assoc.).
47 DEF. INDUS. BASE ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 16.
48 See WILLIAM A. ROOT ET AL., UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS xxii (5th ed. 2007).
49 See 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(1); 22 C.F.R. § 123.1.
50 See Zelnio, supra note 2.
51 See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-120.3 (2009). A predominant military application is either
based on whether an article or service is "specifically designed, developed, configured,
adapted, or modified for a military application, and does not have predominant civil applica-
tions" as well as lacking a civil performance equivalent, or if it has significant military or
intelligence applicability as to warrant this level of control. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3.
52 See Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 212, 90 Stat. 729, (codi-
fied at 22 U.S.C. § 2778).
53 Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2006). "Technologies" is
used here in the broad sense to indicate both defense articles and services.
54 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778.
55 Id.; 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2009).
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most rigid export controls. 6 The ITAR definition of an export includes not on-
ly the physical sending of a defense article out of the United States," but also
oral and visual disclosures of technical information to non-U.S. persons in the
U.S. or abroad, 8 transfers to embassies in the U.S., 9 transfers of aircraft, ves-
sel, or satellite registration, control or ownership,' and the performance of de-
fense services anywhere for the benefit of a foreign person.6 As a result and
for example, an office conversation, e-mail, or telephone call with a Canadian
colleague without proper government approval can create an export violation.62
Similarly, the simple act of handing out fliers to potential customers at a trade
show could require prior government approval. 3 As each violation of these
export laws presents the possibility of a one-million dollar fine, export privi-
leges suspension, and ten years imprisonment,' the industry has quickly
learned that ITAR compliance is not to be taken lightly.
U.S. manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of items listed on the USML6'
are subject to strict registration,66 licensing,67 and recordkeeping requirements.68
Foreign companies may also be subject to portions of these regulations if they
are using parts69 and components from a U.S. company,7" have an office located
in the U.S, 7 or employ U.S. citizens or nationals. Foreign companies are also
subject to these regulations if they are involved in a defense project or program
in which U.S. nationals are involved, are sending or receiving technical draw-
ings that originated in or passed through the U.S., or are manufacturing hard-
56 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009). Items included on the list are sometimes referred to in
shorthand as "munitions." This term is misleading because of the twenty-one categories on
the USML, only approximately eight categories cover items that are generally understood to
be munitions. See id.
57 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1) (2009).
58 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1)-(4) (2009).
59 § 120.17(a)(3).
60 § 120.17(a)(2).
61 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.16 (2009) (defining "foreign person"); § 120.17(a)(5) (defining
"defense service").
62 See § 123.1(a)-(b) (2009).
63 See id.
64 See Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006).
65 22 C.F.R. § 129.2 (2009); see 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009).
66 See § 122.1(a) (manufacturer and exporter requirements); § 129.3 (2009) (brokering
registration requirements).
67 See 22 C.F.R. § 123-125 (2009).
68 § 122.5.
69 22 C.F.R. § 123.9(a) (2009).
70 § 121.1.
71 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.9, 129.3 (2009). "The written approval of the [DOS] must be ob-
tained before reselling, transferring, transshipping, or disposing of a defense article to any
end user, end use or destination other than as stated on the export license .... " 22 C.F.R. §
123.9 (2009).
72 22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a) (2009).
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ware based on U.S. specifications.73 Legislation controlling defense articles
often takes a very broad scope.74 For example, "if a satellite is on a munitions
list, every component down to a simple screw becomes a munition.""5
2. Department of Commerce
The Department of Commerce controls exports of hardware and technology
which may have both civilian and military applications, otherwise known as
"dual use."76 Under the Export Administration Act ("EAA") of 1979,"7 the
president is delegated the authority to administer controls over exports of dual
use hardware and technical data.78 The Commerce Department administers
these exports through the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR").79 The
president's authority also extends to designating which items the DOC will
control on the Commerce Control List ("CCL"). ° The term dual use generally
"serves to distinguish EAR-controlled items that can be used both in military
and other strategic uses and in civil applications . . . ." However, some of the
items on the CCL may also be strictly commercial in nature."
The EAR and the ITAR define export similarly, and the definition includes
actual shipments and releases of technology to foreign nationals." The EAR
also requires prior approval of designated transfers83 and meticulous record-
keeping. 4 However, unlike under the ITAR, the countries involved are taken
73 Cf §§ 120.9, 120.10 (defining defense service and technical data to include transfers
of specifications to foreign nationals in the United States or sending such data abroad).
74 See Wallerstein, supra note 1, at 11. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2009) (export
definition); 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2009) (technical data definition); 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2009)
(policy on designating and determining defense articles and services); 22 C.F.R. § 129
(2009) (definitions of brokering); 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009) (entries broadly defined on the
USML). In November 2009, a new definition of "brokering" was proposed which acknowl-
edged the previous definition's overly broad scope. At the time of writing, this proposed
regulation is still in notice and comment period. See FR Public Notice RIN 1400-AC37.
75 Sandra I. Erwin, Export Rules Under Fire for Eroding U.S. Space Industry, NAT'L
DEF. MAGAZINE, June 2009, at 26.
76 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.1, 730.3, 772.1 (2009).
77 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503.
78 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2403-2404 (2006).
79 See 15 C.F.R. § 730 (2009); see generally §§ 730-744.
80 15 C.F.R. § 774 (2009). The DOC's CCL is similar to the DOS's USML. In the
event that jurisdiction between the two agencies is unclear, DOS's jurisdiction has priority.
See William A. Root, John R. Liebman, & Roszel C. Thomsen II, UNITED STATES EXPORT
CONTROLS § 1.2 (5th ed. supp. 2008).
81 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2009). For example, Export Control Classification Number
("ECCN") 0A980 controls horses by sea and ECCN 1C988 controls western red cedar. 15
C.F.R. § 774 (2009).
82 Compare 15 C.F.R. §§ 772.1, 734.2(b) (2009), with 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2009).
83 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(1) (2009).
84 15 C.F.R. § 762 (2009). For example, records may be kept in an electronic format
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into consideration when determining if a transfer under the EAR requires a
license." Commerce Department regulations do not require prior approval for
brokering transactions, registration fees, or the application for approval of cer-
tain transfers through a specialized form of agreement. 6
Table 1. Summary Relevant Export Control Acronyms by Agency
Department of State Department of Commerce
Enabling Act AECA EAA
Regulations ITAR EAR
Control List USML CCL
D. Brief History of Export Controls for U.S. Communications Satellites
Like many other newly developed technologies with potential military ap-
plications, communications satellites started under State Department jurisdic-
tion.87 As commercial communications satellites progressed along the product
life cycle88 and became more commonplace, President Clinton removed them
from the USML in 1996.89 Commercial communications satellite regulation
only if meeting a number of conditions including preservation of both sides of each paper
record, even if blank. § 762.5(b).
85 Compare 22 C.F.R. § 123.1 (requiring an export license for all USML items under
the ITAR), with 15 C.F.R. § 732 (process for determining whether a license is required un-
der the EAR for items listed on the CCL). Under the ITAR, the general process for deter-
mining a license requirement is: (1) to see if any parties in the transaction have been sanc-
tioned, (2) determine that the item is on the USML, (3) check to see if any license exemp-
tions apply. Under the EAR, steps one and two are similar (with a determination on the CCL
instead of the USML) but before step three there is an additional step of cross-referencing
the reason for control of the particular entry on the CCL with the Commerce Country Chart
to see if a license is required. Only if a license is required will step three be required. See
also Root, Liebman, & Thomsen II, supra note 80, at 2-15-18, 4-16.
86 However, a number of exchanges under State Department control require the drafting,
prior approval, then signing of either a Technical Assistance Agreement, a Warehousing and
Distribution Agreement, or a Manufacturing License Agreement. See 22 C.F.R. § 124.1
(2009).
87 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (Category XV) (2009). See Zelnio, supra note 2.
88 The product life cycle is a management tool used to describe the four main stages that
a new product goes through once introduced into the market. The stages are production,
growth, maturity, and decline. During the third stage, the maturity stage, "[p]rofits stabilize
or decline because of increased competition." See PHILIP KOTLER & KEVIN LANE, MARKET-
ING MANAGEMENT, 278-90 (2009); see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY,
157-62 (1980).
89 Removal of Commercial Communications Satellites and Hot Section Technology
From State's USML for Transfer to Commerce's CCL, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,894-56,896 (Nov.
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switched from State Department regulation to Commerce Department regula-
tion before switching back again to the State Department in 1999.90 This rever-
sal was not due to a new generation of innovation,9 but rather, the reversal was
a result of a policy war between the executive and legislative branches that
started long before the original 1996 move.92
III. CONGRESS'S DECISION HAS PROVEN TO BE A MISTAKE
Treating the whole array of U.S. satellite technology with a one-size-fits-all
approach under the State Department has created significant difficulties for the
U.S. industry.93 This regulatory shift has overburdened the State Department,
and frustrated the communications satellite industry, which is forced to navi-
gate regulatory ambiguities and outdated control mechanisms-all of which
are exacerbated by increased competition in the global market.
A. Overburdened Agency, Regulatory Ambiguities, and Outdated Controls
Create Barriers
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
commenced a war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the U.S. de-
fense budget increased by 67 percent between 2001 and 2008."4 Nearly over-
night, the State Department became inundated with export license applications
5, 1996) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121.1 and 15 C.F.R. pt. 774). Authority is given to the
president to remove items from the USML under the Arms Control Export Act of 1976. See
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006).
90 See Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): Control of
Commercial Communications Satellites on the United States Munitions List; 64 Fed. Reg.
13,679-13,681 (Mar. 22, 1999) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121.1).
91 See Porter, supra note 88, at 157-62; KOTLER & LANE, supra note 126, at 278-90.
92 See Removal of Commercial Communications Satellites and Hot Section Technology
From State's USML for Transfer to Commerce's CCL, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,894-56,896 (Nov.
5, 1996) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121.1 and 15 C.F.R. pt. 774). See also SHIRLEY A. KAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA: POSSIBLE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS UNDER U.S.
SATELLITE EXPORT POLICY - ACTIONS AND CHRONOLOGY 40-58 (Sept. 5,2001), available at
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/98-485.pdf (providing a complete chronology of the
policy struggle).
93 See Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Sherman).
94 Travis Sharp, Growth in U.S. Defense Spending Over the Last Decade, CENTER FOR
ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION, Feb. 26, 2009,
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/022609_fy] 0_toplinegr
owth decade/. This figure was calculated based on Sharp's data of U.S. defense spending,
concluding that $426 billion was spent in 2001 and $709 billion was spent in 2008. See id.
See also Anup Shah, World Military Spending, GLOBAL ISSUES,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending#tab-content-us-miIitary-




for shipping hardware to U.S. troops and allies.95 As the volume of applications
has risen, the number of Directorate of Defense Trade Controls ("DDTC") li-
censing personnel have not increased at a comparable levels.96 The commercial
communications satellite industry has been forced to compete with requests for
war-time necessities in the State Department's approval review queue.97 The
DDTC reviews applications for all activities involving the transfer of defense
articles and services listed on the USML on a case-by-case basis.9" On average,
nearly 7,000 new applications are received each month, but historically DDTC
has not been able to close that many applications per month. Therefore, the
DDTC begins each month with an increased backlog.99
The effect of the delays may be amplified because a U.S. satellite manufac-
turer could need up to six licenses for all phases of marketing, manufacturing,
design, and launch of a single commercial communications spacecraft. °
Transactions over a certain monetary threshold or involving certain technolo-
gies also require congressional notification before a license authorizing their
transfer can be approved.' These delays leave American companies at a com-
petitive disadvantage, unable to commit to a firm project schedule or delivery
date, which foreign companies in the satellite industry can do.
The ITAR creates additional problems as well. For example, much of the
State Department's export control system depends upon companies properly
self-classifying their products and services against broad entries on the
USML °2 These broad entries sometimes do not include technical parameters,
95 U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., DEFENSE TRADE: STATE DEPARTMENT NEEDS TO CONDUCT
ASSESSMENT TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS INEFFICIENCIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE ARMS Ex-
PORT PROCESS 2 (2007) [hereinafter "DEFENSE TRADE GAO REPORT"]. Exports to U.S troops
still require prior approval in the form of an export license. 22 C.F.R. § 120 (2009).
96 DEFENSE TRADE GAO REPORT, supra note 95, at 13.
97 U.S. Dept. of State, Police-Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Country Related
Information, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/country_related info.html (follow Af-
ghanistan and Iraq Licensing Guidelines hyperlinks). Preference is given to approvals to
send equipment to U.S. troops and allies involved in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id.
98 See U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., DEFENSE TRADE: STATE DEPARTMENT NEEDS TO CONDUCT
ASSESSMENT TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS INEFFICIENCIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE ARMS Ex-
PORT PROCESS 5 (2007) [hereinafter GAO INEFFICIENCY REPORT].
99 See U.S. Dept. of State, License Processing Times,
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/metrics/ (last visited March 9, 2010). From April 2009 through
March 2010, the average number of cases received was 6,833; the average number of cases
closed was 6,818, and the average backlog carried over to the next month was 3,199. Id.
100 See Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 57 (statement of Patricia Cooper,
President, Satellite Indust. Assoc.).
101 22 C.F.R. § 123.15 (2009) (requiring Congress be notified before any license over
$14 million (or $50 million for North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") countries) is
approved). Congress must provide a certification in order for approval to take place. Id.
102 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.3-120.4 (2009) (providing the policy on designating and deter-
mining defense article and services).
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which can lead industry and government alike to over-classify certain products
that do not have military capabilities. 3 Companies may submit a request to
DDTC for formal classification; 104 however, these requests are also generally
delayed and leave companies in a holding pattern.' ITAR also defines broker-
ing very broadly,"° leading to regulatory confusion regarding exactly who has
these obligations. This confusion is partially due to unsettled limits of extrater-
ritorial application of ITAR claimed by the DDTC. °7
The ITAR's controls are also outdated in their substance and approach.
While the USML is reviewed by the president and obsolete technologies are
removed or downgraded to DOC control,0 8 these reviews are not conducted
with the frequency necessary to remain connected to new innovations."° Addi-
tionally, ITAR only has special provisions for transactions involving a handful
of current U.S. allies." The outdated approach of the regulations is shown
through examples of an isolationist, Cold War mentality that dominated U.S.
foreign policy when they were written."' Revealing controlled technical data to
a non-U.S. citizen or resident is deemed to be an export of this information to
the person's home country; ..2 therefore, U.S. companies must request this in-
formation from customers and partners. The substance and approach of the
ITAR has frustrated both U.S. and foreign companies and has only been made
exacerbated by the long delays and ambiguities associated with these regula-
tions.
103 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Cat. XXI (controlling "miscellaneous articles"). In contrast, the
Department of Commerce often bases entries to the CCL on technical specifications of the
products instead of actual or intended users. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (2009). Particular hardware
and technology are added to the USML for their military applications. 22 C.F.R § 120.2-3
(2009). But they can also be added as part of a more general catch-all category if any mili-
tary worldwide is interested in the hardware or technology. Id.
See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (providing a commodity jurisdiction procedure for classifying
articles in which "doubt exists as to whether [it] is covered by [USML].") (2009).
105 See GAO INEFFICIENCY REPORT, supra note 98, at 20.
106 See 22 C.F.R. § 129.2(a) (2009).
107 See Charles L. Capito III, Inadequate Checks and Balances: Critiquing the Imbalance
of Power in Arms Export Regulation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 297, 327, 329-31 (analyzing
the differences between the interpretations of the extraterritorial application of ITAR and the
ACEA made by the DDTC, the courts, and Congress).
108 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006).
109 See Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 42 (statement of Patricia Cooper,
President, Satellite Indust. Assoc.).
110 Canada is the only country currently eligible for a list of specialized license exemp-
tions. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.5 (2009). The United Kingdom and Australia are to be given
priority license review under the ITAR. See § 126.15. Member countries of the NATO as
well as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are given special treatment with regards to the
handling of technical data transfers to foreign nationals of those countries and for other pri-
ority situations. See 22 C.F.R § 123.27(a)(1) (2009).
iuI See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.




The trends of globalization and privatization of related industries support the
conclusion that shifting control to the State Department has significantly dam-
aged American satellite companies' ability to compete in the global market-
place.
1. Globalization + Privatization = Heavy Competition
Globalization has transformed every industry and has opened up local busi-
nesses to global supply chains and new sources of information." 3 Products and
services in any country may contain the labor and materials of a dozen other
countries before reaching the final market."4 Given the restrictions imposed on
the U.S. industry by the ITAR, such collaboration becomes extremely difficult
and in some cases impossible."5 U.S. commercial communications satellites
are increasingly rejected in the world market because of the regulatory strings
attached." 6
Stringent regulations that lead to the exclusion of American companies are
particularly problematic in an interconnected world. Speaking to the competi-
tiveness of U.S. defense articles, one commentator noted that, "[t]he assump-
tion that the United States always will be on the leading edge of technology is
false. As the increasing competitiveness of other countries is making clear, it is
very likely that a greater number of innovative technologies with military ap-
plications will come from abroad."" ' 7 While American companies remained the
most innovative and competitive for years, the State Department regulations
have made it difficult for U.S. companies to regain their edge."8 Globalization
brings increased competitiveness, but with the current regulatory scheme, the
American industry is not positioned well to compete in the global economy."9
Furthermore, the intensity of competition among commercial satellite manu-
facturers is exacerbated by the relatively limited number of high-value, long-
term contracts.'2 °
Competition has also increased during this time due to increased private in-
113 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOB-
ALIZATION 8-9 (rev. ed., Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux 1999) (2000).
114 See id.
115 See Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 2-3 (statement of Rep. Sherman).
116 See DEF. INDUS. BASE ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 46, 48.
117 Guay, supra note 6, at 67.
118 See DEF. INDUS. BASE ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 46-49.
119 See id.
120 See Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 42 (statement of Patricia Cooper,
President, Satellite Indust. Assoc.).
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volvement in the space sector overall.'2 ' The ORBIT Act'2 was passed in 1999
to allow private companies to bring satellite communications to "every corner
of the globe."'23 NASA has started relying upon private carriers to send sup-
plies to the International Space Station.'24 Similarly, for $8,000 private citizens
can even purchase their own personal satellite for launch. 25 All of these events
are further indications that competition in the space industry has and will con-
tinue to increase. If U.S. firms are to compete as the market continues to trans-
form and open up, they cannot be confronted with unnecessary regulatory hur-
dles and the added costs of compliance.
2. ITAR-Free Satellites
The growing frustrations of foreign companies over ITAR were exemplified
in 2007 when Thales Alenia Space, a French satellite manufacturer, announced
that it had successfully completed a new "ITAR-free" satellite.' 26 ITAR-free is
used to designate a hardware or technology that does not have any develop-
ment history, components, or manufacturing that would trigger the require-
ments of the ITAR. In other words, the product must be entirely commercial in
nature or, in the case of satellites, be entirely outside of any U.S. design, manu-
facture, or supply.
The Thales Alenia Space satellite was entirely devoid of any U.S. compo-
nents or technical situations that would bring it under the jurisdiction of the
ITAR. 127 The satellite's materials cost over six percent more than similar U.S.
components, 28 signifying that sourcing considerations-and the accompanying
regulations-go outside of economic supply and demand curves. This satellite
project demonstrated that while U.S. legislation and regulations may be aimed
at protecting American national security, they also provide an incentive to stop
partnering with American satellite companies. 29 ITAR-free bids are now re-
quired for some programs of the European Space Agency.'0 Since the sale of
121 See Flying High, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2009, at 87-88 (detailing different ways
that the space sector is becoming increasingly privatized) [hereinafter Flying High].
122 Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-180, 114 Stat. 48 (2000) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 761-69 (2006)).
123 145 CONG. REC. 1497, 1897 (1999) (statement of Sen. Bums).
124 See Flying High, supra note 121, at 87-88.
125 See, e.g., Interorbital Systems, TubeSat Personal Satellite Kit,
http://interorbital.com/TubeSat-l.htm (last visited March 12, 2010).
126 Peter B. de Selding, supra note 8.
127 See id.
128 Id.
129 See Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 41-44 (statement of Patricia Cooper,
President, Satellite Indust. Assoc.).
130 Id. at 44.
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the first ITAR-free satellite, at least six more have been sold to satellite opera-
tors in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Egypt, and Europe.'
C. Net Result: Significant Loss in Global Market Share
In 2007 a comprehensive study by the DOD on the effect of export controls
on the overall space industrial base found that since the ITAR policy change in
1998, the U.S. share of commercial communications satellite manufacturing
had fallen by nineteen percent.' In 2009 an industry group reported that the
number had dropped even further.'33 For the overall space industry, lost sales
directly attributable to the ITAR totaled a cumulative $2.35 billion from 2003
to 2006.134 While there has been overall economic growth of the global industry
during the time in question, the U.S. portion of this growth has diminished in
both manufacturing and launching services. As a result, the U.S. space sector is
becoming increasingly dependent upon U.S. government spending to provide
for the industry.1 35 A large number of U.S. firms, especially smaller ones, no
longer market their products overseas because of ITAR regulations.36
IV: WHY CONGRESS TARGETED COMMERCIAL SATELLITES
Congress passed the legislation moving all satellites under State Department
regulations for two reasons. First, Congress was concerned that China could
gain valuable information from satellite launch technology that could harm
America's national security interests.'37 Second, some members of Congress
believed that President Clinton had allowed campaign contributions to improp-
erly favor commercial interests above national security interests.'38
A. China
In 1998 Congress held hearings on the national security consequences of the
Commerce Department's approved satellite exports to China, as well as allega-
131 Id. at 43.
132 Id. at 46.
133 Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 43 (statement of Patricia Cooper, Presi-
dent, Satellite Indust. Assoc.).
134 DEF. INDUST. BASE ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 34.
"' Id. at 26.
136 Id. at 37; MARTY HAUSER & MICAH WALTER RANGE, ITAR AND THE U.S. SPACE IN-
DUSTRY, SPACE FOUNDATION 2, 7, AVAILABLE AT
HTrP://www.SPACEFOUNDATION.ORG/DOCS/SPACEFoUNDAnON ITAR.PDF.
137 China Satellite Technology Hearing, supra note 15, at 1 (statement of Sen. McCain).
138 Id. at 2-4.
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tions that China had acquired American satellite technology illegally.'39 China
has been of historic concern to U.S. national security because of its ties with
proliferation countries and the sheer size of its armed forces. 40 Following hu-
man rights abuses during the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989, President
George H.W. Bush placed sanctions on the export of military equipment to
China.'4' Under those sanctions, such items could only be exported to China by
a presidential waiver.'42
While control of commercial communications satellites was still originally
under State Department control, the agency issued export licenses to Loral, a
U.S. manufacturer of satellites, allowing it to export satellites for launch in
China.'43 President George H.W. Bush had signed the appropriate sanction
waivers.'" Shortly after the waiver was issued, Loral sent the satellite to China
for launch,'45 and upon launch, in February 1996, the $200 million satellite
blew up and was destroyed.'"
Loral created an Independent Review Committee which shared with the
Chinese government its findings on the cause of the accident.'47 Loral provided
China with controlled technical data related to the inner workings of the satel-
lite, information that required prior export approval from the United States.'48
Beyond the transfer violating U.S. laws,'49 the incident concerned the U.S.
government because the Chinese government could possibly use the technical
information provided to improve their country's missile program."'
In addition, Loral had transferred other regulated information before the
1996 explosion.' The potential for future satellite launch failures concerned
139 See KAN, supra note 13, at 22-27.
140 See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILI-
TARY/COMMERCIAL CONCERNS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, H.R. REP. No. 105-
851 xxxvi-xxxvii, available at http://www.house.gov/coxreport/cont/gncont.html [hereinaf-
ter Cox REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA 1-7 (2006), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf.
141 China Sanctions Approved by Senate in 81-10 Vote, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1989, at
A4.
142 See KAN, supra note 13, at 17. Presidents George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clin-
ton waived export restrictions 13 times for satellite projects from time the restrictions were
first imposed in 1989. Id. at 19.
143 See COX REPORT, supra note 140, at Vol. 11, 109.
144 See KAN, supra note 13, at 21.
145 Id. at 21, 50.
146 See Gerth, supra note 11.
147 Cox REPORT, supra note 202, at Vol. II, 109.
148 See KAN, supra note 13, at 5-6.
149 Id. at 5. Export violations are punishable by civil fines and criminal prosecutions. See
15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(1), (b) (2009); 22 C.F.R. § 127 (2009).
150 See Cox REPORT, supra note 140, at Vol. II, 115.
151 See KAN, supra note 13, at 24-25; see also Cox REPORT, supra note 140, at vol. 2, 2.
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those in the Senate who were proponents of revisiting DOC authority to ap-
prove these transactions.'52 They were also concerned that the DOC did not
place additional provisos on license applications that would have required
technology control plans and other safeguards.'53
The Commerce Department argued that the agency had followed all statu-
tory requirements before approving subsequent satellite licenses.'54 The Com-
merce Department also argued that "treating China as a committed adversary is
the quickest way to ensure it becomes one" and urged Congress to consider the
Chinese people who depended on these satellites for communication.'55 Finally,
the Commerce Department believed that Chinese access to communications
satellites benefits the United States.'56 Congress, in shifting satellite communi-
cation export control to the State Department, clearly disagreed that a less re-
strictive trade policy with China would benefit U.S. economic interests more
than it would endanger American national security interests.
However, this regulatory shift did not stop China from increasing its mili-
tary, missile, and satellite capabilities. In 2007, China demonstrated its in-
creased missile capabilities when it launched an anti-satellite missile into
Earth's low orbit.'57 China has also launched "ITAR-free" satellites, which
showed that China does not need the involvement of the United States in order
to continue launching satellites into space. 58 Many other countries of concern
continue to grow their space programs despite the U.S. restrictions. "'
152 China Satellite Technology Hearing, supra note 15, at 6 (statement of Sen. McCain).
153 See id. at 27-28. A technology control plan ("TCP") is a plan that a company submits
to either BIS or DDTC to obtain licenses to transfer controlled technical data. The TCP lays
out a plan for controlling access to that data at all stages of the transaction and transmission.
TCPs for similar transactions approved by DDTC require U.S. persons to accompany the
communications satellites and secure them from unauthorized access prior to launch. See id.
at 28 (statement of Franklin Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense).
154 See id. at 19-20.
155 United States Policy Regarding the Export of Satellites to China: Joint Hearings
before the Comm. on National Security Meeting Jointly with Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 105th Cong. 261 (1998) (statement of William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary for Ex-
port Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Reinsch Testimony].
156 See id. at 85 (statement of Rep. Gilman); see also Samuel R. Berger, Op-Ed., Launch-
ing Satellites in China Is Good for the U.S., WALL ST. J., June 3, 1998, at A18 (arguing that
a ban on U.S. companies from launching satellites from China would "endanger American
leadership in the global satellite business.").
157 See China Confirms Satellite Downed, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6289519.stm.
158 See de Selding, supra note 8.
159 GEORGE ABBEY & NEAL LANE, AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI., UNITED STATES SPACE
POLICY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES GONE ASTRAY 5 (2009), available at
http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/spaceUS.pdf.
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B. An Improper Balance of Commercial and National Security Interests?
Some members of Congress also expressed concern that the transfer of con-
trol from DOS to DOC may have been partially motivated by the fact that the
president's political party had received financial contributions from those asso-
ciated with the Chinese government. 6 ° Senator John McCain believed that the
President's decision to transfer control allowed "the export of commercial sat-
ellites with less oversight from those vested with safeguarding our national
security."'' Senator McCain also alleged that the Commerce Department had
caved to pressures from the American satellite industry instead of taking the
time necessary to conduct a proper review of license applications.'62 He argued
that the Commerce Department was not the proper agency for approving satel-
lite exports because its decisions are primarily based on political and economic
considerations, not national security." 3 In passing the law, Congress believed
that the only way to properly balance the country's commercial and national
security interests was to move control of all satellites to the State Department
indefinitely. However, an investigation by the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
into any potential wrongdoing by the Clinton Administration with the Loral
incident concluded without criminal charges being filed."6
The need to balance the country's commercial and security interests has not
changed with time. Because a large amount of military innovation occurs with-
in the commercial sector, a thriving commercial space sector is also necessary
in order to protect national security.'65 Mitchel B. Wallerstein, a former U.S.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-proliferation Policy and
Senior Defense Representative for Trade Security Policy, recently wrote that
the general approach to U.S. export controls "undermine national security in at
least four ways." '166 Wallerstein notes that U.S. firms may focus on purely
commercial technologies to avoid the controls; foreign manufacturers with
more advanced products may not compete for U.S. defense contracts; the U.S.
military cannot get parts or maintenance on equipment in the field; and U.S.
defense attaches are impeded from collaborating with foreign defense offi-
cials.'
6 7
General Kevin P. Chilton, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, ex-
160 See China Satellite Technology Hearing, supra note 15, at 1-2 (statement of Sen.
McCain).
161 Id. at 5-6.
162 See id at 5.
163 See id at 5-6.
164 Kan, supra note 13, at 57, 64.
165 See Export Controls, supra note 44, at 17-18 (statement of Pierre Chao, Senior Asso-
ciate, Center for Strategic and International Studies).




pressed his concerns about the current system of export controls for satellites:
"[O]ur own civil and commercial space enterprise, which is essential to the
military space industrial base, may be unnecessarily constrained by export con-
trol and regulation."'68 Although Congress attempted to correct the perceived
imbalance of favoring commercial interests over national security, time has
shown that shifting all control to the State Department has instead managed to
damage both sides of that balance.'69
Despite American efforts to control exports to many countries which threat-
en its national security, many nations, including North Korea and Iran, have
attempted to launch satellites in the past year.70 The Center for Strategic and
International Studies concluded that "current space export control system has
not prevented the rise of [foreign space capabilities] . . . ." and may have actu-
ally encouraged it in some cases. 7'
In addition, arguing that satellites should be moved to State Department con-
trol to improve a perceived imbalance is a slippery slope because that rationale
could be applied to nearly every item on the CCL, since each of those items is
"dual use."'72 With the transfer of jurisdiction for commercial satellites to the
Department of Commerce in 1996, the Commerce Department held the respon-
sibility to neutrally weighing commercial and national security interests as
mandated under the EAA.'73 Now that commercial satellites fall under State
Department control, this balance has tilted strongly towards national security
concerns, away from commercial interests.
V. SATELLITE JURISDICTION SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE
PRESIDENT
Congress' directive to move export controls to the DOS has failed to suffi-
ciently address commercial and national security concerns. Removing this au-
thority from the president's discretion has created unnecessary inconsistency,
inflexibility, and harmed American commercial interests without any increase
168 Turner Brinton, Gen. Chilton: Export Controls Pose Threat to National Security,
SPACE NEWS, Mar. 23, 2009, at 20.
169 DEF. INDUS. BASE ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 48-49.
170 See William J. Broad, Korean Missile Launch Was a Failure, Trackers Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at Al; Iran: Satellite Launch is 'Source of Pride', CNN.coM, Feb. 3,
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/02/03/iran.satellite/.
171 Export Controls Hearing, supra note 44, at 22 (statement of Pierre Chao, Non-
Resident Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
172 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.2, 772.1, 774 (2009); see discussion supra Part II.C.2 and ac-
companying notes 76-86.
173 See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat., 503, 503-04,
506-07, 511 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2404). See also Reinsch Tes-
timony, supra note 155, at 82-85.
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in national security. Congress should restore authority to the President to de-
cide which agency controls these exports. As the Commerce Department's
purpose is best suited to regulate these exports, it should be given that control.
A. Congress's Failure to Respond to the Industry's Legitimate Concerns
Studies have shown that America's global market share of the satellite
communications industry has been negatively affected by Congress' deci-
sion. "'74 If Congress believed that continuing to treat commercial communica-
tions satellites as munitions was in the country's best national security inter-
ests, it should have also increased the State Department's budget in order to
properly handle the influx of war-time export applications. Despite congres-
sional efforts to address major problems in the administration of the AECA
and DDTC, these bills have failed on the floor of Congress,'75 including the
most notable proposed change that would restore the president's authority to
decide which agency should control exports of all satellites.'76 Congress should
pass this bill immediately.
B. The Case for Department of Commerce Control
The Department of Commerce has made changes in its management and
regulations that suggest that a change of jurisdiction is now appropriate. The
agency has made internal changes that give a greater priority to national secu-
rity interests. For example, the Commerce Department's export control office
has changed its name from the Bureau of Export Administration to the Bureau
of Industry and Security to better reflect its increased security focus.'77 The
Department of Commerce employees perform many of the same export ap-
proval review processes as the State Department, but the Department of State
has been historically understaffed.' The Department of Commerce has a duty
174 See, e.g., Phillip L. Spector, Satellite Export Controls: Five Years and Counting, 18
AIR & SPACE LAW 12, 12-14 (2003).
175 See, e.g., Defense Trade Controls Performance Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 4246,
110th Cong. (2007); Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008,
H.R. 5916, 110th Cong. (2008); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011, H.R. 2410, 111 th Cong. (2009).
176 See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, H.R. 2410 §
826(a), 111 th Cong. (2009).
177 See Kenneth I. Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Secu-
rity, Department of Commerce, Keynote Address at the Information Technology Associa-
tion of America/Prudential Securities Conference on e-Security and Homeland Defense
(May 22, 2002).
178 See U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., DEFENSE TRADE: STATE DEPARTMENT NEEDS TO CONDUCT
ASSESSMENT TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS INEFFICIENCIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE ARMS Ex-
PORT PROCESS 13-14 (2007).
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to further commerce in the United States.'79 At the same time, it also has a duty
to ensure that their regulations permit business to function with as few controls
necessary to protect national security and other concerns.'8 °
Proposals to reform the ITAR, such as imposing limits to licensing times
and streamlined processes, are already covered in the EAR and management of
the Commerce Department.' The exceptions to licensing requirements avail-
able from the agency are much broader and easier to use in application than the
license exemptions available from the State Department because the Com-
merce Department exceptions are listed in one place.'82
The Department of Commerce has also introduced new authorizations with-
in the last year to keep up with the increasingly global nature of many U.S.
businesses. For example, the Validated End-User ("VEU") authorization intro-
duced in 2007 allows U.S. exporters to ship to a specific list of pre-approved
end users without additional approval.'83 The EAR is better focused on coun-
tries and transfers of greatest concern without complicating all other transac-
tions.'84 Additionally, because the DOC's controls are more performance spe-
cific,'85 the Commerce Department will better be able to notify the American
communications satellite industry of exactly which technologies are of con-
cern. Under Commerce Department regulations, the industry's ability to export
both hardware and technical data will greatly improve.
179 Department of Commerce, About Commerce,
http://www.commerce.gov/AboutUs/index.htm (last visited March 19, 2010).
180 Department of Commerce, Guiding Principles of the Bureau of Industry and Security,
http://www.bis.doc.gov/about/bisguidingprinciples.htm (last visited March 19, 2010).
181 15 C.F.R. §§ 750.2, 750.4 (2009).
182 Compare 22 C.F.R. § 125.4(b), with 15 C.F.R. § 740.6 (illustrating the difference
between the amount of controlled technical data that may be exported without a license);
compare 22 C.F.R. § 123.4, with 15 C.F.R. § 740.9 (demonstrating the difference between
the two regulations on temporary imports and exports). In a narrow set of circumstances, if
the proposed transaction meets the requirements on an established license exemption or
exception, an exporter may rely on the use of such an exemption or exception in place of
obtaining an export license. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.
183 Revisions and Clarification of Export and Reexport Controls for the People's Repub-
lic of China (PRC); New Authorization Validated End-User; Revision of Import Certificate
and PRC End-User Statement Requirements, 72 Fed. Reg. 33, 647 (June 19, 2007) (codified
at 15. C.F.R § 748.15).
184 See ROOT ET AL., supra note 48, at 2-18, 4-16.
185 See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 774.2, Supp. No. 1, 0B001.
[Vol. 18
Communications Satellite and U.S. Export Controls
Table 2. Summary Comparing DOS and DOC Export Control Regimes.
Department of State Department of Commerce
Approval Times No regulatory limit. Capped at forty-five days with
escalation process.
Congressional Required for specified Required for specified transac-
Notification transactions. tions.
Commodity Historically handled Defer to the DOS on jurisdic-
Jurisdictions through ad hoc submission tion, but classifications of
process. Electronic process items within the CCL are han-
coming soon. dled through electronic appli-
cation similar to license appli-
cation.
Control List No comprehensive evalua- Last comprehensive update
Updates tion has been completed in was completed in 2008.
the last ten years.
Treatment of Mostly limited to individ- Licensing requirements are
U.S. Allies ual treaties, limited other established by country.
preferential treatment for
NATO allies
Brokering Broad definition and par- No special licensing required
ticularized requirements. for brokering activities.
Deemed Exports All deemed exports to for- Deemed exports require a li-
to Foreign eign nationals require a cense only to foreign nationals
Nationals license unless exempted. of countries that would require
a license.
Reasons for End use based controls Predominantly specification
Control that include some product based controls with capability
specifications. to control for end use.
Registration Fees $2,250 each year plus None.
as Small $250 for each approval





There is an improper balance between U.S. commercial interests and na-
tional security that once again must be adjusted. If the domestic communica-
tions satellite industry is to prevail during an era of globalization, it must be
better able to collaborate with the rest of the world and not be burdened by
regulatory barriers that its competitors do not face. Increased global competi-
tion has allowed U.S. prime and component manufacturers to be avoided and
this trend of "ITAR-free" requests seems to be growing. American companies'
global market share continues to decrease. Countries of concern to the United
States have continued to obtain and develop satellites and launching capabili-
ties, illustrating that broad sweeping controls are not necessarily protecting
national security either.
Congress' original reasons for placing control of these exports under the
State Department are no longer valid. Yet, Congress has refused to respond
and restore presidential control to fix this problem. Federal agencies have more
expertise on the export controls necessary for commercial communications
satellites than Congress does. Moving the decision for which agency regulates
export controls of satellites back under the power of the president would allow
for the satellites to fall under Commerce Department control. As dual use tech-
nologies with predominant civilian applications, non-military communications
satellites belong under Commerce Department control. The Department of
Commerce is better suited to handle the American communications satellite
industry's legitimate commercial needs expediently, while still addressing na-
tional security concerns.
Congress should immediately pass legislation to give the president back his
authority to decide which export controls are proper for satellites. While fixing
the problem now will not undo all the damage experienced by the industry in
the last decade, it will be a step in the right direction of restoring the balance
between the interests of American industry and national security.
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